US Bans DA-ASAT Tests
United States committed “not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile testing, and that the United States seeks to establish this as a new international norm for responsible behaviour in space.” The announcement by US Vice President Kamala Harris on Monday 18 April 2022 is the first initiative in establishing national security space norms to advance United States’ interests and preserve the security and sustainability of space. [The White House, New U.S. Commitment on Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Testing, 18 April 2022; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/]
Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves today, Tuesday 19 April 2022, welcomed the commitment, issuing the following statement:
“The Commerce Department welcomes the announcement by Vice President Harris not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests. Space should be a safe place to operate the thousands of satellites that provide boundless benefits to people around the globe. Previous tests conducted by the Peoples’ Republic of China in 2007 and the Russian Federation in November 2021 created significant debris hazards for all low-earth orbiting satellites.
“This new commitment announced by the Vice President helps protect U.S. interests in space, including our space-based environmental monitoring platforms. Meaningfully reducing ASAT testing and debris generation advances U.S. national security interests and protects long-term U.S. interests in space exploration, space science, and space-enabled economic development.” [US Department of Commerce, Deputy Secretary Graves Statement on Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests, 19 April 2022; https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2022/04/deputy-secretary-graves-statement-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile]
Both the White House and the Department of Commerce releases refer to ASAT tests by China and Russia without mention of those conducted by the US or India. [Michael C Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations under Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty, Researchgate, September 2008; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228149659_FY-1C_and_USA-193_ASAT_Intercepts_An_Assessment_of_Legal_Obligations_under_Article_9_of_the_Outer_Space_Treaty; Sa’id Mosteshar, Indian Missile Adds to Space Debris Risk, The Guardian, 29 March 2019; https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/mar/29/indian-missile-adds-to-space-debris-risks]
It is to be noted that the commitment refers to DA-ASAT tests and not to all ASATs. ASAT weapons launched into space generally fall into one of two categories: direct-ascent or co-orbital systems. Direct ascent systems use rockets to put an interceptor on a suborbital trajectory that intersects with the target in orbit without the interceptor entering orbit itself. The ASAT weapon systems tested so far fall in this category. By contrast, co-orbital systems use a Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) to place the interceptor into orbit, after which it manoeuvres to either collide with or pass near the target. China, Russia, the US and others are actively developing their rendezvous and close-proximity systems and capabilities. [Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-satellite Testing in Space, The Space Review, 17 March 2014; https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1]